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MEDIATION EXCEPTIONALITY
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley*
INTRODUCTION
If Alexis de Tocqueville had the opportunity to observe contemporary
mediation practice in the United States and England, he might agree that
there is a story to tell about difference-a story about how mediation is
treated differently from other nonadjudicatory dispute resolution processes l
in both common-law jurisdictions. I will refer to this difference as
"mediation exceptionality. ' '2 One of the primary features of mediation
exceptionality is the disparate manner in which mediation is promoted and
delivered. In the United States, mediation is, in theory, a voluntary,
consensual process, based on the principle of party self-determination. The
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators echo this understanding by
emphasizing the importance of informed consent both as to process and
outcome. 3 But mediation is frequently delivered as a quasi-consensual or
nonconsensual process. Compulsory participation in a variety of contexts is
the norm in many court referral schemes.4 Mediation is also promoted as a
* I would like to thank Rachel Vorspan, Ed Purcell, Jonathan Hyman, Marianna Hernandez
Crespo, Kathleen Scanlon, and, in particular, Nancy Welsh for helpful comments, and
Colleen Hibbert for research assistance.
1. E.g., negotiation, consensus-building, conciliation, etc.
2. I distinguish exceptionality from exceptionalism in the sense that the latter involves
a belief in some kind of superiority, not just difference between alternative approaches. See
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 18
(1996) (discussing Alexis de Tocqueville's description of the United States as exceptional).
De Tocqueville was struck by American characteristics such as individualism,
egalitarianism, and leanings toward litigation as a method of dispute resolution. Oscar G.
Chase, American "Exceptionalism " and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMp. L. 277,
280 (2002); see also Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-
Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal
of Adversarial Adjudication (Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
1229249, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1229249.
3. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard I (2005). While
mediation is theoretically a voluntary and consensual process, I thank my colleague Nancy
Welsh for reminding me that in reality, mediation is sold as a cheap and quick process.
4. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 authorized federal courts to compel
parties to participate in certain Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes, including
mediation. 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2006). On the state level, compulsory mediation takes place
in different contexts under various statutory schemes. See SARAH RUDOLPH COLE, NANCY
HARDIN ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEwEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 7:2 (2008).
As early as 1997, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution that supported court
mediation programs. See SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AM. BAR ASS'N,
RECOMMENDATION & REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 227 (1997); see also G.
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consensual process in England but is delivered under the shadow of the
court's power to penalize parties who resist the invitation to mediate.5 The
infusion of nonconsensual attributes into mediation, particularly in court-
related programs, is one of the distinct features of mediation that is not
shared generally by other nonadjudicatory dispute resolution processes. 6
Another example of its exceptionality is mediation's departure from the
application of general legal rules. In England, instead of the usual rule that
the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful
party, mediation presents the exceptional case where costs may be imposed
on a successful party whose consent to mediation is deemed to have been
withheld unreasonably. 7 In the United States, application of the usual rules
of contract law to mediation has been questioned by some scholars who
argue that mediated agreements should be treated differently from standard
contracts-that laws should provide for "cooling off' periods before
mediation agreements take effect so that parties have the opportunity to
exercise a right of rescission.8
A primary feature of mediation exceptionality that has resulted in the
growth of consent litigation is the blending of consensual and
nonconsensual attributes. In the United States, litigation focuses on party
consent at the end point of mediation when an agreement has been reached;
a significant body of case law involves challenges to the enforceability of
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding
mandatory judicial settlement conference); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The
Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 461 (2007) (proposing
that negotiation should be required before permitting the filing of a complaint).
5. For this reason, some observers suggest that England is "almost" a compulsory
mediation jurisdiction. See Antoine Masson & Fiona Breen, Keeping the Essence of
Mediation, 1 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REv. 371, 372 (2007).
6. As observers of the U.S. ADR landscape are aware, a similar problem has occurred
with the arbitration process. Arbitration clauses in employment, consumer, and securities
contracts have generated wide public debate as well as proposals for federal legislation to
insure fairness in arbitration. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 11 lth
Cong. (2009) (pending).
7. See discussion of Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS Trust, infra notes 91-108
and accompanying text.
8. In my view, these are welcome correctives, and I endorse such proposals. See infra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text. Some states have already modified traditional contract
laws relating to the enforcement of mediated agreements in order to enhance the quality of
the mediation. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 100089.82(c) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.7015(6) (West 2005); MINN. STAT. § 572.35(2) (1998); see also COLE, ROGERS &
McEwEN, supra note 4, § 4:13. A variation of mediation exceptionality includes attempts by
courts to encourage settlements by developing disincentives to trial. This phenomenon is
described by Cole, Rogers, and McEwen:
The development of disincentives reflects an approach to legal policy that departs
from the focus of other procedural reforms of the century-rather than trying to
decrease delay and expense and increase the impartiality of the trier of fact, these
provisions do just the opposite. Disincentives are an attempt to improve court
efficiency by lowering the numbers of parties who can afford to or dare to use the
trial apparatus.
Id. § 7:1.
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mediated agreements, particularly in the area of contract formation.9 In
contrast, the emphasis in English litigation has been on party consent at the
front-end of mediation, before the process even begins, and there are a
substantial number of cases challenging the imposition of costs for a party's
failure to participate in mediation. 10
I. PROFESSOR OWEN FISS
Against Settlement 1 I can be considered a presage for mediation
exceptionality. Just six years after the Pound Conference jump-started the
modem ADR settlement movement, Professor Owen Fiss staked out
objections to what he considered the peace for justice trade-offs of ADR. 12
One of his objections centered on the quality of consent in settlement. 13
Fiss claimed that consent from some individual litigants was often
coerced, 14 and that in the case of groups, there were no procedures for
generating authoritative consent. 15
Fiss was wise to sound the early warnings on the fragility of consent in
ADR settlement processes. He should have been concerned, however, not
only with groups involved in large-scale public litigation but even with the
quarreling neighbors who are somewhat trivialized in his critique.
Litigants' vulnerability with respect to consent can be recognized most
vividly today in the institutionalization of settlement in court-connected
mediation programs. 16 Fiss's quarreling neighbors come to court seeking
9. James Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at
Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 73-89 (2006). In this study,
enforcement issues were raised in 568 opinions, representing forty-six percent of the study.
Id.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
12. Id. at 1085-86. For an insightful, alternative reading of Fiss, see Amy J. Cohen,
Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2009).
13. Fiss, supra note 11, at 1078-82. In addition to the lack of consent, Fiss was also
concerned with the disparity of power between parties of unequal bargaining power, the
quality of justice, and the loss of opportunity for the courts to make structural changes. Id. at
1076-78.
14. Fiss describes parties who "are ensnared in contractual relationships that impair their
autonomy" and gives as an example lawyers and insurance companies whose settlement
choices might not be in the best interests of their clients. Fiss, supra note 11, at 1078.
15. Id. at 1075, 1078-82. Certainly, Fiss was not alone in his critique. See, e.g., Edward
Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987);
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668 (1986); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose
It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 81; Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
16. A substantial amount of literature has responded to this culture change with mixed
reviews. Compare Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a
Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 93 (2002), with Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A.
Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization
of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399 (2005) (questioning whether ADR has
fulfilled the justice goals of the Pound Conference).
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justice through the formalities of law-black-robed judges, the adjudication
process, and invoking of rules of law. 17 Instead, they are referred to a
mediator who will take a first shot at their case, which will not necessarily
be cast as a dispute, but as a joint problem to be solved by the neighbors
themselves. Despite one's view of the merits of institutionalizing
mediation, there have been negative consequences. It has diminished party
choice in dispute resolution generally, 18 and with this diminution has come
a significant weakening in the values associated with consent. 19
This essay views mediation exceptionality through the lens of mediation
consent litigation that has occurred over the last ten years in the United
States and England. It is a tale of two regimes that explicitly endorse
mediation through laws and rules of civil procedure but do so through
different structural designs. One is quasi-consensual, the other is
compulsory. Parties who come to court searching for justice through law in
the adjudication process are invited in the case of England-and often
coaxed or compelled in the United States-to participate in mediation, a
different process that invokes different values. In mediation, multiple
values, including law, may be relevant in resolving a dispute. Not all
litigants are interested in pursuing justice in this fashion, and mediation
push-back in both countries has generated considerable litigation over the
issue of consent.
The historical connections between English equity jurisdiction and U.S.
mediation practice make the comparative tale of these two regimes a useful
lens through which to view consent practices.20 While the United States is
a more advanced mediation jurisdiction than England in terms of case
volume and institutionalized experience, its mediation foundations borrow
from the tradition of English equity jurisdiction. 21 Both mediation and
equity claim to offer individualized justice to disputing parties. 22 Both
regimes were conceived as part of an access to justice project. Equity
jurisprudence developed to soften the harshness of common-law rules; U.S.
mediation practice developed in part to provide access to justice that was
considered to be otherwise unavailable in the common-law civil justice
system. 23 With the merger of law and equity and, more recently, of law and
17. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through
Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47 (1996).
18. See Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research
Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 101 (emphasizing self-determination
as a critical design element for dispute resolution systems).
19. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2001);
see infra Part II.
20. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from
Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57 (2004).
21. See generally Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CrN. L. REv. 329
(2005).
22. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 17, at 85-87.
23. See NADJA ALEXANDER, GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION 1-36 (2d ed. 2006).
1250 [Vol. 78
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mediation, scholars today question whether equity is still equitable 24 and
whether mediation offers justice. 25
II. MEDIATION AND CONSENT
Part of the contemporary skepticism about the ultimate justice and
fairness of mediation results from the manner in which consent is honored
in theory and dishonored in practice. 26 Consent holds an important place in
law generally, 27 and is assumed to be an overarching value in contemporary
dispute resolution. With mediation, consent is frequently the selling point.
This is a type of consent that Professor Fiss would perhaps describe as the
"individualistic, unanimous consent exalted by the social contract
tradition." 28
Mediation consent has two elements: front-end, participation consent
which should occur at the beginning of the mediation process and continue
throughout the process; and back-end, outcome consent which should be
present when parties reach an agreement in mediation.29 The rhetoric of
mediation consent is couched in rights-infused terms such as autonomy and
party self-determination. 30  Mediation consent gives disputing parties
ownership of their dispute and the right to decide its outcome. 31 Consent
theoretically guards against coercive behavior by third-party facilitators and
honors party participation. Apart from its fairness, justice, and human
dignity values,32 consent matters a great deal in mediation because of its
instrumental value. Consent is linked to sustainability-it implies a
commitment to honor one's promise.
Contemporary models of compulsory and quasi-compulsory dispute
resolution seriously limit disputants' ability to influence how their disputes
are resolved.33 Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than with court-
24. Main, supra note 21, passim.
25. Nolan-Haley, supra note 20, at 59, 64-71; see Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the
Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 49 (2004); see also Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a
Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 157 (2002).
26. See generally Symposium, Justice in Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 59
(2004).
27. See generally DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONSENT IN THE LAW
(2007).
28. Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 121, 128 (1982).
29. For a discussion of why both elements are necessary to achieve informed consent in
mediation, see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding
Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 775 (1999).
30. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard I (2005).
31. Nolan-Haley, supra note 29, at 776.
32. Id. at 787-92.
33. See Donna Shestowsky, Disputants' Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 550 (2008) (arguing that disputants' "ability to influence how their
disputes are resolved is often co-opted by the courts to which they turn for assistance"). In
the international arena, see Cesare P. R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the
2009] 1251
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connected mediation programs, now a regular feature in both common-law
and many civil-law jurisdictions. 34 The parties' initial buy-in to mediation
may be based on its traditional promises of neutrality, empowerment and
recognition, privatization, problem-solving, 35 or what Deborah Hensler
calls "mediation's harmony ideology. '36 But this is not necessarily the
picture that emerges from the practice of mediation. Whether it is a
dramatic account of settlement as the only way out of jail, 37 or more
traditional case reports of duress and coercion, some of the actual practices
of mediation bring a dose of reality to the romanticized version of the
mediation story. 38
Even where parties voluntarily agree to participate in mediation,39 their
consent may be uninformed. 40 Consent is only as good as the disclosure
that precedes it, and there is a growing recognition by thoughtful scholars of
an opacity problem in mediation. Many aspects of mediation that should be
disclosed are not. Some examples include the mediator's style or
orientation. 41 Is it transformative? Facilitative? Evaluative? 42 Narrative?
This information can have a direct bearing on the outcome of mediation, but
it is not usually disclosed to parties.43 Represented parties are at less risk of
proceeding in the dark because lawyers typically exert considerable
Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791 (2007).
34. See ALEXANDER, supra note 23; ANNIE DE ROo & ROB JAGTENBERG, THE PRACTICE
OF MEDIATION IN COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING THE NETHERLANDS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF THE DUTCH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (2003) [hereinafter DUTCH
REPORT]; Bert Niemeijer & Machteld Pel, Court-Based Mediation in the Netherlands:
Research, Evaluation and Future Expectations, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 345 (2005).
35. See BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 85 (2004) (listing as four characteristics of mediation: (1)
impartiality, (2) process orientation, (3) problem-solving, and (4) client-focused).
36. Hensler, supra note 15, at 84.
37. Michael D. Young, Federal Judge Gone Wild? Seeking Rescission, Producer
Francis Claims His Mediated Settlement Was Coerced by Jail Time, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO
THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 170 (2008).
38. See, e.g., Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are More Voluntary Than Others, 26
JUST. SYS. J. 273 (2005) (analyzing coercion in mediation); Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing
Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-Tension Between the Aspirations of a
Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 509, 527-35 (2004) (analyzing duress and undue influence in mediation).
39. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Consent in Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2008, at
4-5 (American Bar Association Dispute Resolution Section).
40. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 29, passim.
41. Considering the number of mediator approaches identified in the literature and the
Model Standards requirement that parties make free choices with respect to process and
outcome, Professor Frank Sander has suggested that mediators should disclose their styles.
Frank E. A. Sander, Achieving Meaningful Threshold Consent to Mediator Style(s), DISP.
RESOL. MAC., Winter 2008, at 9.
42. See generally Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid
and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003).
43. See Jeffrey H. Goldfien & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, What If the Lawyers Have Their
Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict Strategies and Attitudes Toward Mediation
Styles, 22 OHIo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 277 (2007).
1252 [Vol. 78
MEDIA TION EXCEPTIONALITY
influence on the choice of mediator style or orientation." But what
happens to pro se parties who remain uninformed?
Another area that calls for greater transparency to achieve informed
consent is identification of the specific nature of the "problem" that is the
subject of mediation. Will it be a broad definition of the problem that will
permit parties to include a meaningful discussion of their needs and
interests? Or will it be a narrow understanding limited to legal issues?
Professors Nancy Welsh and Leonard Riskin have written recently about
the problem-identification issue in mediation. They describe the repeat
players in civil, nonfamily disputes who move fluidly between the litigation
system and court-connected mediation, narrowly structuring the mediation
process to fit a litigation mold.45 Plaintiffs who are often one-shot players
are no match for the repeat players who narrow the definition of the
problem to be resolved and the set of available remedies. Private caucuses
with the mediator rather than joint sessions with all the parties are the norm,
leaving little space for parties to express underlying or nonlegal interests.46
In effect, parties who may think that they signed on to an authentic
mediation process find themselves in what looks like a traditional, legalistic
negotiation setting.
III. THE AMERICAN MEDIATION STORY
The central ideology of American mediation is its voluntariness. Most
ethical codes and practice standards define mediation as a voluntary process
grounded in party self-determination.47 Mediation rhetoric, focusing on
empowerment and recognition, is grounded in voluntariness. The Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators emphasize the importance of informed
consent--"each party makes free and informed choices as to process and
outcome." 48 Nevertheless, mandatory mediation regimes are standard fare,
with several different models ranging from strong-armed judicial
suggestions, to making mediation a condition precedent for trial. 49 U.S.
courts and legislatures have had little problem in requiring parties to
44. Id. at 282-87, 309-18. Welsh and Riskin found that in court-connected mediation
of "ordinary" cases, lawyers tend to prefer evaluation. In the mediation of larger commercial
cases with sophisticated parties on both sides, clients and their lawyers tend to prefer
mediators who can accomplish many tasks, including getting at underlying interests,
facilitating, evaluating, etc. Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?:
"The Problem" in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 863, 924-25 (2008);
see also Dwight Golann, The Changing Role of Evaluation in Commercial ADR, DisP.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2007, at 16, 18-19 (contrasting private commercial mediation and court-
connected mediation).
45. Riskin & Welsh, supra note 44, passim.
46. Id. at 904-26 (offering three approaches that courts and private providers can use to
assist parties in developing the most appropriate problem definitions and processes).
47. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, Standard I (2005).
48. Id.
49. The methods of case referral and program design differ, but I include within the
definition of mandatory regimes all types of pressured entry into mediation.
20091 1253
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participate in the "voluntary" process of mediation, 50 and in some
jurisdictions they must do so in good faith.51
Mandatory mediation has become an acceptable feature of the civil
justice landscape 52 despite the collateral problems inherent in these referral
schemes. 53 The standard American explanation for what appears to be an
internally inconsistent structure is that there is a difference between
coercion into a process and coercion in a process. While courts may require
parties to attend and participate in mediation, no one may coerce parties
during the process or pressure them into accepting a particular outcome. 54
In short, front-end, participation consent is dispensed with, while back-end,
outcome consent is required.55
A review of mediation litigation in the United States suggests that
mandatory mediation regimes have supported a culture of gentle coercion
even when parties voluntarily participate in mediation and report their
satisfaction with the process. In 1993, Professor Craig McEwen described
what he labeled the "paradox of mediation," namely that when parties in
conflict who are reluctant about mediation are required to mediate, they find
the process fair and satisfying and would recommend it to others. 56 More
recent studies of court-connected mediation in general civil cases show that
parties report mediation to be a fair process and are positive about
50. There is no uniformity with respect to methods of case referral and program design
in U.S. mediation programs. I include within the concept of mandatory mediation those
situations where there is strong judicial encouragement to mediate.
51. See COLE, ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 4, § 7:6. The good faith statutes have
resulted in a body of case law dealing with failures to negotiate in good faith. Courts
generally uphold party self-determination and refuse to find that failure to make an offer in
mediation amounts to a violation of the obligation to participate in good faith. See John
Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods To Promote Good-Faith Participation in
Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 78-86 (2002).
52. See COLE, ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 4, § 7. For a debate on the merits of
mandatory mediation, see Richard C. Reuben, Tort Reform Renews Debate over Mandatory
Mediation, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2007, at 13, and Frank E. A. Sander, Another View of
Mandatory Mediation, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2007, at 16.
53. For a discussion of some of these problems, see generally Reuben, supra note 52.
54. This distinction, which was originally articulated in the first edition of Stephen B.
Goldberg et al.'s Dispute Resolution, is criticized by Sally Merry, who argues that "[i]f
parties are aware that a more coercive process will ensue if mediation fails, the dynamics of
the mediation will differ sharply from 'pure mediation,' because the expectation of an
imposed settlement will inevitably alter the meaning of the event for all the actors." Sally
Engle Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2066 (1987) (reviewing
STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)).
55. The United States is certainly not alone with its mandatory mediation schemes.
Australian courts have long upheld their right to require parties to mediate despite the
absence of their consent, but their justification is somewhat more transparent. Hooper Bailie
Associated Ltd. v. Natcon Group Pty Ltd. (1992) 28 N.S.W.L.R. 194, 206 ("What is
enforced is not co-operation and consent but participation in a process from which co-
operation and consent might come."). The Australian studies of mandatory mediation show
that settlement rates and reports of satisfaction are similar to voluntary mediation. See
KATHY MACK, NAT'L ADR ADVISORY COUNCIL & AUSTRALIAN INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.,
COURT REFERRAL To ADR: CRITERIA AND RESEARCH (2003).
56. Craig A. McEwen & Thomas W. Mitborn, Explaining a Paradox of Mediation, 9
NEGOTIATION J. 23 (1993).
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procedural justice. 57  But, the growing volume of mediation consent
litigation signals that something more is going on than the satisfaction story
tells us,58 particularly in court-connected mediation.59  Compliance is
becoming problematic. In a study of litigated mediation cases for the
period from 1999 through 2003, Professors James R. Coben and Peter N.
Thompson found that the highest number of cases dealt with challenges to
the enforceability of agreements reached in mediation. 60 A follow-up study
for cases litigated in 2004 through 2005 again found that enforceability was
the most highly litigated issue. 61 One of the lengthiest sections in Cole,
Rogers & McEwen's classic treatise, Mediation: Law Policy & Practice,
deals with challenges to the enforcement of mediated agreements.62 While
enforceability cases include those dealing with procedural defects, such as
missing signatures, etc., a large number of cases relate to the quality of a
party's consent to the agreement that was reached in mediation.63
It is not just the volume of mediation consent cases that is problematic,
but the manner in which those cases are adjudicated. Traditional contract
defenses that permit rescission for fraud, duress, and undue influence have
been relatively unsuccessful in mediation because courts tend to enforce
mediated agreements, 64 even in the face of claims that the agreement is
contrary to public policy.65 According to Professors Coben and Thompson,
"[R]arely has a mediation participant successfully defended against
enforcement of a mediated agreement based on a traditional contract
defense." 66 The weakness of traditional contract rules to remedy consent
defects has caused some scholars to suggest a greater use of cooling off
57. See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What
We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 641, 690 (2002).
58. See, e.g., COLE, ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 4, § 4.13; Coben & Thompson,
supra note 9.
59. See Hedeen, supra note 38 (analyzing coercion in mediation); Thompson, supra note
38, 527-35 (analyzing duress and undue influence in mediation).
60. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 9.
61. James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, 1
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 395 (2007). Enforceability cases continued in 2006. Id.
62. See COLE, ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 4, § 4:13.
63. It is difficult to determine what percentage of enforcement cases result from court-
connected as opposed to voluntary mediation. The reported enforcement cases do not
always indicate whether or not they arose in a court-connected setting.
64. COLE, ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 4, § 4:13; Coben & Thompson, supra note 9,
at 73-74; Andrew N. Weisberg, Comment, The Secret to Success: An Examination of New
York State Mediation Related Litigation, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1549, 1552-59 (2007).
65. See Washington v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
mediation agreement should be upheld even if it restricts a party's interest in freedom of
expression).
66. Coben & Thompson, supra note 9, at 49. In this study, sixty-one percent of the
agreements were enforced, seventeen percent were not enforced, eleven percent were
remanded for additional proceedings, eight percent had no decision, and three percent were
modified. COLE, ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 4, § 4:13.
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periods to protect self-determination and leave parties free to exercise their
rights of rescission.67
IV. THE U.K. STORY
In England there is a somewhat different mediation story to tell. Parties
must consent both to participate in mediation and to any agreements that are
reached in mediation. But if a party refuses to give front-end, participation
consent, and the refusal is deemed unreasonable by a court, then costs
sanctions may be imposed.68 Thus, even parties who are successful in
litigation may have to pay costs if they unreasonably refuse consent to
mediation. 69  This is contrary to the general English rule that the
unsuccessful party pays costs. 70 Compared to mediation litigation in the
United States, with its high number of cases challenging the enforceability
agreements made in mediation, English consent litigation is comprised
largely of cases that relate to refusals to participate in mediation. If parties
do consent to participate in mediation, it is unlikely that they will later
challenge any agreement made in mediation. 71
67. Coben & Thompson, supra note 9, at 135-36; Welsh, supra note 19, at 87; see also
James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey
of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REv. 171, 206 (2001) (reviewing enforcement cases
and urging that courts enforce mediated settlements "within a framework that recognizes
mediation's unique character and attributes"); Steven Weller, Court Enforcement of
Mediated Agreements: Should Contract Law Be Applied?, JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 13,
39 (suggesting that because a mediator's power distinguishes mediation from arm's length
settlement, judges should rescind agreements if there is a disparity in expertise between the
parties and the weaker party misunderstood the agreement or its consequences). Other
reform suggestions include judicial oversight for cases that are referred to mediation during
litigation in order to "detect cases in which mediators' own economic interests resulted in
objectively bad settlements." Peter L. Murray, The Privatization of Civil Justice, 91
JUDICATURE 272, 316 (2008).
68. The American rule is that each party must bear his or her own costs except where the
litigation is vexatious or an abuse of process. Congress has enacted a number of fee-shifting
statutes that are exceptions to this rule.
69. England's cost-shifting approach to encourage mediation is similar in some respects
to court-annexed arbitration programs in the United States that impose penalties against
parties who reject an arbitral award in favor of a trial de novo unless a more favorable result
is obtained at trial. Despite numerous challenges to these programs, courts have upheld them
as legitimate means of promoting settlement. ALAN SCOTT RAu, EDWARD F. SHERMAN &
SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 540 (4th ed.
2006).
70. The exercise of the court's discretion regarding costs is found in Part 44.3 of the
Civil Procedure Rules. The general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay
the costs of the successful party. CPR 44.3(2)(a), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/
civillprocrules fin/contents/parts/part44.htm#IDAMJI5B. In deciding how to assess costs,
the court must look at all the circumstances, including the conduct of the parties. CPR
44.3(4)(a). Conduct includes behavior during the proceedings and in pre-action protocols.
71. Compared to the United States, in England there are far fewer challenges to the
enforceability of mediated agreements. See, e.g., Brown v. Rice & Patel & ADR Group,
[2007] EWHC (Ch) 625; Crystal Decisions (UK) Ltd. v. Vedatech Corp., [2007] EWHC
(Ch) 1062 (attempting to set aside the settlement agreement on the grounds of fraud).
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A. Historical Background
There is a substantial history of family mediation practice in England that
dates back to the mid-1970s, 72 but the modem mediation movement
developed in conjunction with civil justice reform efforts in the 1990s.73
As a result of general dissatisfaction with the delays, inflexible proceedings,
and general malaise of the civil justice system, the Lord Chancellor directed
Lord Woolf to examine the civil justice system and offer proposals for
reform. Lord Woolf's findings described what one scholar has labeled "a
rather depressing picture of the English civil justice system which is
incomprehensible to litigants, costs significant sums of money and makes
no or little use of modem technology. ' 74 Lord Woolf issued an interim and
final report, Access to Justice, which dramatically altered the civil justice
landscape. 75 His proposals made litigation less appealing by instituting
strict case management by judges and urging lawyers to educate their
clients about ADR options and to encourage them to use ADR.76
The Final Report concluded that despite the crisis in the English civil
justice system, England was not ready for a mandatory ADR regime.
According to Lord Woolf, "the problems in the civil justice system in this
country, serious as they are, are not so great as to require a wholesale
compulsory reference of civil proceedings to outside resolution. '77 The
report formed the basis of a uniform Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) for
England that took effect in April 1999.78 The CPR empowered courts to
encourage parties to use ADR methods to resolve disputes, and to penalize
litigants who failed to engage in appropriate ADR processes. 79 The breadth
of reforms led the Lord Chancellor to conclude that it was "the most radical
72. See Janet Walker & Sherrill Hayes, Policy, Practice, and Politics: Bargaining in the
Shadow of Whitehall, in HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION: BRIDGING THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
PRACTICE 99 (Margaret S. Herrman ed., 2006). There is also experience with mediation in
labor disputes. See DUTCH REPORT, supra note 34, at 66.
73. Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 167, 170
(2001); see also HAZEL GENN ET AL., TwISTING ARMS: COURT REFERRED AND COURT LINKED
MEDIATION UNDER JUDICIAL PRESSURE 1-20 (2007).
74. Mistelis, supra note 73, at 178.
75. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE-INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR
ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1995) [hereinafter LORD WOOLF,
ACCESS TO JUSTICE-INTERIM REPORT], available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civilU
interim/contents.htm; LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE-FINAL REPORT (1996), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm.
76. It should be noted that "references to ADR [in England] are usually understood as
being [a] reference[] to some form of mediation." Halsey v. Milton Keynes Gen. NHS Trust,
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 576, [5].
77. LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE-INTERIM REPORT, supra note 75, ch. 18, 32.
78. Civil Procedure Rules, 2005, SI 1998/3132, available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules fin/menus/rules.htm.
79. For an American example of attempting to encourage settlement through procedural
rules, see FED. R. CIV. P. 68, the Offer of Judgment Rule, which permits a defendant to serve
an offer of judgment on the plaintiff. FED. R. Civ. P. 68. If the plaintiff rejects the offer, she
is liable for post-offer costs if she does not improve on the offer at trial. See Robert G. Bone,
"To Encourage Settlement": Rule 68, Offers of Judgment, and the History of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1561, 1562 (2008).
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programme for the modernisation of the civil justice system for 120
years. '80 Beyond the courts, the promotion of ADR was extended to the
government with the announcement of an "ADR Pledge" in March 2001 by
the Lord Chancellor, in which all government departments and agencies
made a commitment to consider ADR in all suitable cases "wherever the
other party accepts it."'81
B. Case Law Development
Following the enthusiasm for ADR generated by Lord Woolf s report
and the implementation of the CPR reforms, the practice of mediation
began to generate consent-related litigation. In a series of cases between
2001 and 2004, the English courts grappled with questions about the extent
of their power to promote a culture of settlement through compulsory
mediation. If mediation were a panacea for the ills of the civil justice
system, could the courts require parties to participate in it? What could be
done about parties who declined an invitation to mediate?
The first significant case to deal with these questions, Cowl v. Plymouth
City Council,82 involved a public law dispute over the rehousing of elderly
residents in a nursing home run by the Plymouth City Council.8 3 The
Council offered the residents an alternative process to avoid litigation, but
the residents declined the offer.84  The Court of Appeal upheld the
Council's actions as reasonable and expressed strong disapproval that the
case had progressed so far when an ADR process was made available. 85
Lord Woolf offered strong language in both encouraging ADR and in
disapproving of the parties who had failed to use it, particularly where
public money was involved:
Today sufficient should be known about ADR to make the failure to adopt
it, in particular where public money is involved, indefensible.... This
case will have served some purpose if it makes it clear that the lawyers
acting on both sides of a dispute of this sort are under a heavy obligation
to resort to litigation only if it is really unavoidable. 86
Following Cowl, the courts continued to encourage parties to use
mediation but imposed no penalties for failure to use it until the decision in
Dunnett v. Railtrack plc. 87 Here, for the first time, judicial encouragement
turned to quasi compulsion as the court made it clear that a successful party
could be deprived of costs that it would otherwise be awarded because of a
refusal to mediate. 88
80. Mistelis, supra note 73, at 171.
81. Halsey, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576, [7] (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1935.
83. Id. [4], [6].
84. Id. [14].
85. Id. [27].
86. Id. [25]-[27].
87. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 303.
88. Id.
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Dunnett generated considerable commentary questioning whether there
was now a requirement that all cases be mediated. The cases were back and
forth on two interrelated issues: whether courts could require parties to
participate in mediation and, if not, whether a court could impose cost
sanctions against successful litigants who had refused to mediate. 89 The
Dunnett principle was unevenly applied.90 These questions were finally
answered in the conjoined cases of Halsey v. Milton Keynes General NHS
Trust and Steel v. Joy,91 wherein the Court of Appeal held that it should not
require truly unwilling parties to mediate their cases, because compulsory
referral would violate a litigant's fundamental rights to have access to the
courts 92 and run afoul of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.93 Even if it did have jurisdiction to compel unwilling parties to
mediate, the court found it difficult "to conceive of circumstances in which
it would be appropriate to exercise it."' 94 The court specifically rejected the
notion that there should be a presumption in favor of mediation.95
Halsey's rationale for not imposing a mandatory scheme was practical
and pragmatic. Compulsory referral "would achieve nothing except to add
to the costs to be borne by the parties, possibly postpone the time when the
court determines the dispute and damage the perceived effectiveness of the
ADR process." 96 In short, the court held that its role was to encourage but
not compel parties to engage in ADR.97
While compulsory referral to mediation was considered unacceptable,
encouragement to use ADR could be "robust." Accordingly, Halsey upheld
a court's right to impose costs on a party who has unreasonably refused
consent to mediate. 98 In so doing, it readily acknowledged that this was a
departure from the general rule on costs:
In deciding whether to deprive a successful party of some or all of his
costs on the grounds that he has refused to agree to ADR, it must be borne
in mind that such an order is an exception to the general rule that costs
should follow the event. In our view, the burden is on the unsuccessful
party to show why there should be a departure from the general rule. The
89. See Leicester Circuits Ltd. v. Coates Brothers PLC, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 290;
Partridge v. Lawrence, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1122; Hurst v. Leeming, [2001] EWHC (Ch)
1051 (judgment given on May 9, 2002, after the Dunnett v. Railtrackplc. decision).
90. Compare Royal Bank of Can. Trust Corp. Ltd. v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2002]
EWHC (Ch) 1841 (Secretary of State for Defence deprived of costs because of refusal to
comply with the government pledge to use ADR), with Valentine v. Allen, [2003] EWCA
(Civ) 915 (Dunnett distinguished where a party could demonstrate a real effort to
compromise the dispute), and Hurst v. Leeming, [2001] EWHC (Ch) 1051 (limiting the
reach of Dunnett where it appeared that mediation had no real prospect of success).
91. [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576.
92. Id. [9].
93. European Convention on Human Rights art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
94. Halsey, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576, [9].
95. Id. [16] ("We do not, therefore, accept the submission made on behalf of the Civil
Mediation Council that there should be a presumption in favour of mediation.").
96. Id. [10].
97. Id. [11].
98. Id. [13].
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fundamental principle is that such departure is not justified unless it is
shown... that the successful party acted unreasonably in refusing to
agree to ADR.99
The court offered a nonexhaustive list of six factors in determining the
reasonableness of a party's refusal to participate in mediation:
(a) the nature of the dispute; (b) the merits of the case; (c) the extent to
which other settlement methods have been attempted; (d) whether the
costs of the ADR would be disproportionately high; (e) whether any delay
in setting up and attending the ADR would have been prejudicial; and (f)
whether the ADR had a reasonable prospect of success.100
Reasonableness was considered a relevant factor. 10'
In our judgment, it would not be right to stigmatise as unreasonable a
refusal by the successful party to agree to a mediation unless he showed
that a mediation had no reasonable prospect of success. That would be to
tip the scales too heavily against the right of a successful party to refuse a
mediation and insist on an adjudication of the dispute by the court. It
seems to us that a fairer balance is struck if the burden is placed on the
unsuccessful party to show that there was a reasonable prospect that
mediation would have been successful. 10 2
Halsey was greeted with mixed reviews. Some viewed it as a "sensible
compromise,"' 10 3 while others criticized the court's failure to mandate
mediation as "clearly wrong and unreasonable," with the Court of Appeal
being "left in the dark" regarding the prevalence of mandatory mediation in
other jurisdictions. 0 4 Apart from the views of commentators, Halsey had a
significant impact in decreasing the volume of cases that were mediated
under existing court-referral schemes. Evaluation research conducted by
Professor Hazel Genn shows that demand for mediation increased
significantly following the Dunnett case in 2002.105 This is not surprising
because Dunnett permitted costs penalties to be imposed on a successful
99. Id.
100. Id. [16].
101. Id. [25].
102. Id. [28].
103. David Pliener, At Last, Clarity for Mediation, 11 NEw L.J. 878, 878 (2004).
104. Sir Gavin Lightman, Chartered Inst. of Arbitrators, Mediation: An Approximation to
Justice, 73 INT'L J. ARB., MEDIATION & Disp. MGMT. 400, 401 (2007) (criticizing Halsey's
reliance on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to prevent mandatory
mediation and also criticizing the court's burden of proof scheme). For a more explicit
argument that mediation should be mandatory, see Sir Anthony Clarke, Master of the Rolls,
Speech to the Second Civil Mediation Council National Conference: The Future of Civil
Mediation (May. 8, 2008), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/speeches/
mr mediation conferencemay08.pdf ("[A] horse (even a very obstinate horse) is more
likely to drink if taken to water. We should be doing more to encourage (and perhaps direct)
the horse to go to the trough. The more horses approach the trough the more will drink from
it.").
105. GENN ET AL., supra note 73, at 134.
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party who acted unreasonably in refusing to mediate. 10 6 But, rather than
representing an acknowledgement of the benefits of mediation, Professor
Genn suggests that in many of these cases, parties were "unwillingly
mediating to avoid possible costs penalties" under the Dunnett regime. 10 7
However, after Halsey denied the court's power to compel mediation, there
was a significant decrease in demand for mediation. 108
C. Mediation Consent Litigation in England. The Post-Halsey Era
The Court of Appeal's decision in Halsey prompted judges to encourage
parties to use the mediation process, 10 9 and it set the stage for a trajectory of
consent litigation that extends far beyond the issue of participation in
mediation. Halsey's costs scheme that penalizes parties who are deemed to
have unreasonably refused to mediate, has been extended to refusals to
negotiate,110 delays in agreeing to mediate, I 1 taking unreasonable positions
106. Id at 6, 52. The subjects of this evaluation were two court-annexed mediation
programs in the Central London County Court. They consisted of (a) an experiment in
quasi-compulsory mediation, involving automatic referral of cases to mediation, which ran
for a year in the Central London Court between April 2004 and March 2005, and (b) a
review of the operation of the Central London voluntary mediation scheme, which had been
running continuously since 1996. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at 52.
108. Five weeks before Halsey was decided, a pilot quasi-compulsory scheme had been
established in May 2004 in Central London County Court that involved the automatic
referral of selected cases to mediation with an opportunity to opt out. See id. at 1. If parties
failed to mediate and the judge did not accept their reasons, they would be liable for cost
sanctions under Part 44 of the CPR. Id. at 12. Professor Hazel Genn concludes in her
evaluation of the program that, given the opt-out rate of around eighty percent and
interviews she conducted with solicitors, Halsey had a significant effect on the pilot
program:
Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to suggest that, whatever the precise
intention of the court and the interpretation of the case by observers from different
camps, the mood or tenor of the Halsey judgment and its representation in the
professional press, effectively undermined both the object and operation of the
automatic referral to mediation pilot.
Id. at 19.
109. See, e.g., Whitecap Leisure Ltd. v. John H. Rundle Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1026;
Egan v. Motor Servs. (Bath) Ltd., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1002; IDA Ltd. v. Univ. of
Southampton, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 145; Bume v. "A", [2006] EWCA (Civ) 24; Multiplex
Constrs. (UK) Ltd. v. Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd., [2008] EWHC (TCC) 2220; C v. RHL,
[2005] EWHC (Comm) 873 (finding that mediation would be beneficial to the parties).
110. See, e.g., Daniels v. Comm'r of Police, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1312 (finding that
defendant acted reasonably in refusing to negotiate); Sahota v. Singh, [2006] EWHC (Ch)
344 (imposing costs on successful party for refusal to negotiate); Hickman v. Lapthorn,
[2006] EWHC (QB) 12 (finding that a failure to demonstrate that defendant's position as to
mediation and negotiation was unreasonable); see also Gil v. Baygreen Props. Ltd., [2004]
EWHC (Ch) 2029; Multiplex Constrs. (UK) Ltd. v. Cleveland Bridge UK Ltd., [2008]
EWHC (TCC) 2280, [90] (The defendants conceded that they owed money to the claimant
but never made an offer of settlement with respect to this concession. The Court noted that
the conduct of both parties was open to criticism, but the defendants' "obstinate refusal to
make any settlement offer" was the reason this litigation was not settled. Costs were
adjusted accordingly).
111. Nigel Witham Ltd. v. Smith, [2007] EWHC (TCC) 3027.
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in mediation, 112 and even to a party's unreasonable conduct in demanding
an apology as a prerequisite to mediation. 113 Courts have imposed costs for
unreasonable refusals to negotiate or mediate in a number of cases, 114 but
this is by no means the norm. With a great deal of frequency, courts have
found that parties' behavior in refusing to mediate is not unreasonable. 115 It
is difficult to draw clear, definitive conclusions from these cases because
112. Earl of Malmesbury v. Strutt & Parker, [2008] EWHC (QB) 424. The parties
waived the protections of confidentiality, and the court held that the party who agreed to
mediation, but then took an unreasonable position in the mediation, was in the same position
as a party who unreasonably refused to mediate. Id. The court can take account of this
behavior when assessing costs. Id.
113. Merelie v. Newcastle Primary Health Care Trust, [2006] EWHC (QB) 1433; see also
Wright v. HSBC Bank PLC, [2006] EWHC (QB) 1473.
114. See, e.g., Strachey v. Ramage, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 384; Couwenbergh v. Valkova,
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 676; Marchands Assocs. LLP v. Thompson P'ship LLP, [2004] EWCA
(Civ) 878; Chantrey Vellacott v. Convergence Group PLC, [2007] EWHC (Ch) 1774; Sahota
v. Singh, [2006] EWHC (Ch) 344 (discounting of fifty percent for the successful party's
refusal to negotiate); P4 Ltd. v. Unite Integrated Solutions PLC, [2006] EWHC (TCC) 2924
(awarding partial costs because of unreasonable refusal to mediate); cf Burchell v. Bullard,
[2005] EWCA (Civ) 358 (agreeing that the Halsey factors were established and that cost
consequences should be imposed on the defendants but declining to impose costs in the
interest of fairness because the case involved conduct that predated Halsey).
115. See, e.g., Whapples v. Birmingham E. & N. Primary Care Trust, [2008] EWCA
(Civ) 465, [28] ("[I]t is surprising how frequently even the most intractable case produces a
satisfactory outcome in mediation assisted by a trained mediator. But that is a million miles
away from saying that it is so unreasonable of a party not to undertake mediation at a stage
before litigation."); Brown v. MCASSO Music Prods., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1546, [15]
(holding that even if the claimant refused to mediate, a significant balancing factor in
refusing to award costs was the defendant's "unpreparedness to negotiate at a time when the
judge was encouraging negotiation"); Reed Executive PLC v. Reed Bus. Info. Ltd., [2004]
EWCA (Civ) 887, [46] (finding that prospects of a successful mediation were poor); Nigel
Witham Ltd. v. Smith, [2008] EWHC (TCC) 12, [36] (The defendants were the successful
parties. The claimant argued that the defendants failed to mediate until late in the day when
the majority of the costs had been incurred and, thus, their delay in agreeing to mediate
should have cost consequences. The court found however, that "even if there had been
earlier mediation, the Claimant's uncompromising attitude meant that it would not have had
a reasonable prospect of success."); Reynolds v. Stone Rowe Brewer, [2008] EWHC (QB)
497 (determining that mediation had little chance of success); Re Midland Linen Servs. Ltd,
Chaudry v. Yap, [2004] EWHC (Ch) 3380, [56]-[60] (concluding that there was not a
"serious engagement" in mediation that would justify a Halsey finding that the petitioner
should be deprived of costs). It is interesting to note the court's reasoning as to why the
respondents failed to meet their burden of proof that would justify the imposition of costs.
[T]he respondents had not provided sufficient evidence of their intention to go
down the route of mediation to the other side.... [T]he case is marked by a pattern
on behalf of the respondents of making and withdrawing offers, .... hardly an
incentive to the petitioner to negotiate .... I doubt whether the atmosphere that had
been generated between the parties would have enabled a successful mediation to
take place.
Re Midland Linen Servs. Ltd, Chaudry, [2004] EWHC (Ch) 3380, [60]; see also The
Wethered Estate Ltd. v. Davis, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1903, [26] (finding the delay in going to
mediation not to be unreasonable); Allen v. Jones, [2004] EWHC (QB) 1189 (no costs
imposed where mediation would not have been suitable); cf McGeough v. Thomson
Holidays Ltd., [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1509, [26] ("Mediation is a valuable facility, which has a
significant role to play in the administration of justice. It does not in my view assist the
cause of mediation if parties are urged to mediate in a situation in which there is no real
possibility that it will help.").
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they have been decided within the Halsey reasonableness framework.
However, a common rationale for refusing to impose costs has been
reliance on the sixth Halsey factor: namely, whether mediation had a
reasonable prospect of success. That this factor would become a recurrent
theme in costs cases is somewhat unsettling because it is not clear what
"success" meant to the court. Resolution of all pending issues? Some
issues? A better understanding between the parties?"16
V. SOME QUESTIONS To PONDER
The consent litigation spurred by mediation exceptionality in the United
States and England, though a product of different structural designs, raises
common policy questions about the value of consent. 117 Could it be that the
differences between American and English mediation regimes reflect
deeper differences between the two common-law cultures, particularly in
their attitudes towards respect for self-determination and human dignity?" 18
The English courts' focus on reasonableness respects human dignity and
honors the principle of self-determination in practice as well as in theory.
Rather than assuming that talking through mediation will work, English
courts assume that it will not and place the burden of proof on the party
who thinks otherwise and urges revision of the usual cost provisions. 119 In
fact, the Halsey court specifically rejected a proposal that there be a
presumption in favor of mediation. 120 Why is this so?
116. One clue to the court's thinking is the passage it quotes from Hurst v. Leeming,
when Justice Lightman wrote,
If mediation can have no real prospect of success, a party may, with impunity,
refuse to proceed to mediation on this ground. But refusal is a high risk course to
take, for if the court finds that there was a real prospect, the party refusing to
proceed to mediation may ... be severely penalised. Further, the hurdle in the
way of a party refusing to proceed to mediation on this ground is high, for in
making this objective assessment of the prospects of mediation, the starting point
must surely be the fact that the mediation process itself can and does often bring
about a more sensible and more conciliatory attitude on the part of the parties than
might otherwise be expected to prevail before the mediation, and may produce a
recognition of the strengths and weaknesses by each party of his own case and of
that of his opponent, and a willingness to accept the give and take essential to a
successful mediation. What appears to be incapable of mediation before the
mediation process begins often proves capable of satisfactory resolution later.
Halsey v. Milton Keynes Gen. NHS Trust, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576, [23] (quoting Hurst v.
Leeming, [2001] EWHC (Ch) 1051, [13 ]) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. U.S. litigation focuses on consent at the end point of mediation after parties reach an
agreement, whereas in England, litigation relates to consent or the lack of consent at the
front end of mediation. There are far fewer U.S. cases that involve disputes about parties'
obligations to participate in mediation. See Cohen & Thompson, supra note 9, at 105-11
(reporting a total of 279 cases).
118. See infra note 121 & accompanying text (discussing values associated with consent).
119. I thank Nancy Welsh for this insight.
120. Halsey, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576, [16].
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Compared to the United States, very few post-Halsey cases involve
challenges to the enforceability of mediated agreements.121 Could it be that
when parties agree to participate in mediation, they are more likely to honor
the agreements that they make? 122 Could it be that the low number of
mediation enforceability cases in England suggests that American policy
makers should have paid more attention to Fiss's prescient critique of
consent in settlement? Could it be that Fiss had it right twenty-five years
ago?
These reflections on mediation exceptionality beg the question of why
mediation is treated differently from other nonadjudicatory dispute
resolution processes in the United States and England. One explanation
suggested by Fiss's critique points toward the messianic zeal of ADR
proponents, those whom Michael Moffitt labels the ADR "evangelists,"' 123
who are determined in their quest to promote a culture of settlement. But, if
as Fiss claimed twenty-five years ago, the appeal of settlement depends in
large measure upon consent, 124 then several aspects of mediation
exceptionality weaken that foundation. 125 This in turn diminishes the
quality of justice available to parties in mediation.
Contemporary mediation consent litigation may be signaling that
something is amiss in the grand design of ADR. We would do well to pay
attention, remember Fiss, and bring real consent back into the picture.
121. See, e.g., Crystal Decisions (UK) Ltd. v. Vedatech Corp., [2007] EWHC (Ch) 1062
(challenging a mediated agreement on the grounds of duress and fraud).
122. This suggestion is consistent with some empirical evidence that parties are more
likely to comply with mediated agreements than with court judgments because of the value
of consent. See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard S. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims
Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 11 (1984); Roselle
L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process
and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 323, 354 (1995).
123. See Michael Moffitt, Three Things To Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2009).
124. Fiss, supra note 11, at 1078.
125. The specific features that weaken the foundation of consent are the blending of
consensual and nonconsensual features in mediation in the United States and the imposition
of cost consequences in England for unreasonable refusals to mediate.
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